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DISABILITY INSURANCE: INTERPRETATION OF
CONFINEMENT CLAUSES
THE FREQUENTLY-LITIGATED1 confinement clause incorporated into
most' sickness and accident disability insurance policies was the subject
of a recent case, Suits v. Old Equity Life Ins. Co.' A paraplegic sued
for payments withheld under the following provision of his policy:4
If the injury or sickness confines the insured continuously within doors ...
and requires regular treatments therein by a legally qualified physician ...
the Company will pay benefits... so long as such confinement remains con-
tinuous, provided said injury or sickness causes total disability ....
The defendent-insurer, though not contesting disability, contended
that the confinement requirement had not been satisfied. Although
the plaintiff was severely restricted in his activities, he was, among
other things, away from his home for hours at a time and commuted
for two years in his specially-equipped automobile to a university thirty-
five miles distant. The North Carolina Supreme Court reasoned that
the confinement provision, being a contract term, could not be ignored,
and "reluctandy" concluded that the plaintiff's activities had been "too
extensive and too regularly carried on for too long a time to permit him
to qualify for benefits under the confinement provision of the policy. M
Insurers insert confinement clauses in disability policies primarily
because of the difficulty in ascertaining whether a claimant is actually
disabled.7 The rationale is that the confinement requirement provides
' Cases are collected at Annot., 29 A.L.R.zd 1408 (1953). See also, 7 COUCH,
INSURANCE §§ 1678-79 (1930).
2 See Adelman, Confining Clauses in Loss-of-Time Contracts, 1958 INS. L.J. 554.
Virtually all of the disability policies on file with the North Carolina Insurance Com-
mission require confinement to recover sickness benefits. Most of them also have the
same requirement for accident benefits.
a 249 N.C. 383, xo6 S.E.zd 579 (1959).
'Id. at 383, io6 S.E.zd at 58o.
"Id. at 384, io6 S.E.2d at 581.
'Id. at 386, io6 S.E.2d at 581. It should be noted that the court also relied upon
the fact that the policy contained a nonconfinement clause. See notes 13 and 14 and
accompanying text, infra.
'These clauses are variously worded. The insured's sickness or injury, to make him
eligible for benefits, or at least full benefits, must be such as to "'confine [him] to the
house,' the word 'confine' generally being preceded by some or all such qualifications as
'necessarily,' 'continuously,' 'strictly,' and 'absolutely'; and the words 'to the house
being frequently replaced by 'within doors,' 'within the house,' or 'in the house,' or still
a sufficiently objective determinant of disability. Because confinement
is generally onerous, the clause also seems to discourage fraudulent
claims."
There are three basic approaches to the problem.9  Some courts
favor literal interpretation of the confinement provision, and require
that the insured be confined in the plain, ordinary sense of the word.'0
Two principal arguments are adduced: The greatest social value lies in
protecting insurance funds from malingerers511 and, the clause is an
unambiguous contract term which no court should disregard. 2 More-
other variations." Annot., 29 A.L.R.2d 1408, 1411 (1953). Differences in form are
usually disregarded. But see, Cooper v. Phoenix Acc. & Sick Benefit Ass'n, 141 Mich.
478, 1o4 N.W. 734 (19o5) 5 Scales v. Masonic Protective Ass'n, 7o N.H. 490, 48 At.
1084 (1901).
Some clauses require confinement to bed. The insured is also usually required to
receive regular treatments at the place of confinement by a qualified physician. Neither
of these provisions is given much effect by the courts. CoucH, op. cit. supra note I,
at §§ 1679, 168x. In fact, the policy in the instant case included a "treatment therein"
clause. The court disregarded the clause, however.
"Disability is not a sharply definable condition. Its commencement and termination
are rarely susceptible to exact and absolute determination. The character of the appli-
cant often outweighs his physical condition. Disability insurance losses are affected by
many factors including age, sex, earnings, education, environment, heredity, residence,
occupation, physical condition, .general economic conditions and numerous psychological
considerations-many of which are not dearly understood even by the psychologists
themselves." MCCAHAN, ACCIDENT AND SICKNESS INSURANCE 3 (1954).
'Dunning v. Massachusetts Mut. Acc. Ass'n, 99 Me. 390, 59 Atl. 535 (1904)5
Mutual Benefit Health & Acc. Ass'n v. Milder, 152 Neb. 519, 41 N.W.2d 780 (5950) ;
Reeves v. Midland Cas. Co., 170 Wis. 370, 174 N.W. 475 (i919), reh. denied, 170
Wis. 378, 174 N.W. 959 (1920).
' Development of the law in this field has been little less than chaotic. Decisions
are scattered all along the scale of interpretations, even in the same jurisdiction. For
example, note the Missouri cases in Annot., 29 A.L.R.2d 1408 (953). The strong
pull between orthodox contract principles and the sometimes emotive spectacle of
crippled and sick claimants can be held partly accountable. Furthermore, the judge's
social philosophy can have great effect in this area. One court intimates, however, that
the conflict is only apparent and that the approach taken, whether strict or liberal,
depends on whether the court doubts that the policyholder is disabled. Occidental Life
Ins. Co. v. Bocock, 77 Ariz. 51, 266 P.2d 1o82 (1954). Assignment of most cases to
one of the discernible categories is therefore arbitrary at best. Perhaps the only safe
statement is that some courts are more willing than others to lessen the effect of the
clause.
"
0 See Goldsby v. Gulf Life Ins. Co., 117 Fla. 889, 158 So. 5o (1935)5 State ex
rel. Commonwealth Cas. Co. v. Cox, 322 Mo. 38, 14 S.W.2d 6oo (.929).
" See cases cited note 8 supra.
"See Clesi v. National Life & Ace. Ins. Co., 195 La. 736, 197 So. 413 (940);
Rocci v. Massachusetts Acc. Co., 222 Mass. 336, 11o N.E. 972 (19x6), aff'd, 226 Mass.
545, 116 N.E. 477 (1917); Cooper v. Phoenix Acc. & Sick Benefit Ass'n, 541 Mich.
478, 1o4 N.W. 734 (1905)-
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over, policies frequently provide reduced benefits for nonconfining dis-
ability."3 This fosters the contention that liberal interpretation of the
confinement provision will nullify the nonconfinement clause.14
Because literal interpretation of confinement provisions often leads
to inequitable results,'5 even the most conservative courts have adopted
a so-called "reasonable" approach to the problem."0
"s The nonconfinement clause involved in the instant case provided for a monthly
benefit of twenty-five dollars, not to exceed one month, in the event the policyholder
was disabled and nonconfined. There are numerous other versions. Usually the
amount payable is fifty per cent of the confinement benefit. The duration of payments
may be the same as, or much less than, that for confinement. E. J. Faulkner, President
of the Woodman Central Life Insurance Co., reports that the trend is toward elimination
of the distinction between the two clauses on short term policies. MCCAHAN, op. Cit.
supra note 7, at 28. A search through the sickness and accident insurance forms
on file with the North Carolina Insurance Commission discloses, however, that no policy
providing for lifetime sickness indemnity is without the nonconfinement clause.
14 The instant case employed this reasoning. 249 N.C. at 386, xo6 S.E.zd at 582.
See, Sheets v. Farmers' & Merchants' Mut. Life & Cas. Assen, 116 Kan. 356, 2z5 Pac.
929 (1924); Rocci v. Massachusetts Acc. Co., 222 Mass. 336, 11o N.E. 972 (x9x6),
aff'd, z26 Mass. 545, 116 N.E. 477 (1917). It can be concluded with formidable
logic that the nonconfinement clause offers a good compromise solution which necessarily
calls for a narrower construction of confinement. But, one can contend just as cogently
that those nonconfinement clauses which allow only scant benefits cannot be dignified as
a compromise solution. See, e.g., Harris v. Old Equity Ins. Co., 61 N.M. 261, 298
P.zd 943 (1956). In Brandt v. Mutual Benefit Health & Ace. Ass'n, 30 Tenn. App. 14,
202 S.W.zd 827 (1947), the court forthrightly ruled that a nonconfinement clause
should not affect the confinement provision. Many courts which are disposed to granting
recovery do not bring up this problem.
A secondary clause is, indeed, a good way to adjust benefit payments to the seriousness
of a claimant's condition. It is submitted, however, that confinement or nonconfinement
is not the proper issue 5 rather, it should be total disability or partial disability for rea-
sons made clear later in the text. The increased likelihood of fraud created by such a
clause would be balanced by the limited liability.
"See, e.g., Mutual Benefit Health & Ace. Ass'n v. Cohen, 194 F.2d 232 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 343 U.S. 965 (1952) i Lachterman v. Mutual Benefit Health & Acc. Ass'n,
6o S.W.2d 646 (Mo. App. 1933); Reeves v. Midland Cas. Co., 170 Wis. 370, 174
N.W. 475 (1919).
1" Obviously, confinement is not to be considered broken if the claimant has been
forced out by such as fire, natural calamity, or legal order. See Mutual Benefit Health
& Ace. Ass'n v. McDonald, 73 Colo. 3o8, 215 Pac. 135 (1923). Nor is confinement
broken by transfer from one place of confinement to another, short trips of medical
necessity, or short periods in the fresh air. Williamson v. Nurses' Mut. Protective
Corp., 14z Fla. 225, 194 So. 643 (1940); Bankson v. Mutual Benefit Health & Ace.
Ass'n, zo8 La. 1ooS, 24 So. 2d 59 (1945); Ramsey v. General Acc., Fire, & Life Ins.
Co., i6o Mo. App. 236, 242 S.W. 763 (1912). Many policies now specifically permit
trips to a doctor for treatments. No cases have been found in which a court has refused
to accept confinement to a hospital as satisfaction of the policy. There is a split of
authority, however, whether confinement to the grounds of a mental institution is suffi-
cient. See Donlen v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 117 Misc. 414, 192 N.Y. Supp. 513 (192);
Buske v. Federal Cas. Co., 200 Wis. 18, 227 N.W. 239 (.929). For other examples
of "reasonable" construction, see Massachusetts Protective Ass'n v. Pickard, 76 F.2d
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A majority of the courts construe confinement provisions liberally.
They treat confinement as a flexible word of art,'7 which is satisfied if
the claimant is "substantially" confined"' or is required to spend "most"
of his time indoors.' 9 Therapeutic absence is excused on the ground
that curing the claimant is a paramount interest of all the parties.2"
This liberal approach to the problem is flexible enough to achieve a
laudable amelioration of the harshness associated with literal interpreta-
tion. In fact, many of these courts have so diluted the clause that it
has been effectively eliminated-particularly through the therapeutic-
absence exception. 2' Generally, though, it is held that the provision
cannot be totally expunged, and that there must be some significant
degree of confinement.2
There are definite disadvantages in this approach to the problem.
The real bases for decision-the conduciveness of a situation to malin-
gering, the insurers' need for protection from certain types of borderline
infirmities,23 the needs of claimants, and the social role of disability in-
surance-are often glossed over by the vague conclusion that there is
insufficient confinement. Consequently, most decisions are more con-
cerned with the metaphysics of confinement than with basic issues.
684 (5th Cir.), reh. denied, 77 F.zd xoo6, cert. denied, 296 U.S. 598 (i93s); Cara-
belli v. Mountain States Life Ins. Co., 8 Cal. App. 2d 115, 46 P.2d xoo4 (935);
Mutual Benefit Iealth & Acc. Ass'n v. Milder, 152 Neb. 519, 41 N.W.2d 780 (1950).
"'The term is considered "ambiguous." As subh it inust be subjected to judicial
interpretation. See, e.g., National Ace. & Health Ins. Co. v. Mergenov, 49 Ohio App.
353, 197 N.E. 248 (x935).
1" See Penrose v. Commercial Travelers Ins. Co., 75 Idaho 524, 275 P.2d 969
(1954) ; Purcell v. Washington Fid. Nat'l Ins. Co., 146 Ore. 475, 30 P.zd 742 (1934).
1" See Hoffman v. Michigan Home & Hosp. Ass'n, 128 Mich. 323, 87 N.W. 265
(i9o) ; World Ins. Co. v. McKenzie, 212 Miss. 809, 55 So. 2d 46z (1951).
'o Columbian Relief Fund Ass'n v. Gross, 25 Ind. App. 215, 57 N.E. 145 (1900).
" Conceivably, any conduct which a doctor may say is good for a patient can be
considered therapeutic. For examples of what the courts have accepted as therapeutic
treatment, see Mutual Benefit Health & Ace. Ass'n v. Murphy, 209 Ark. 945, 193
S.W.zd 305 (1946); Mutual Benefit Health & Acc. Ass'n v. Burrow's Ex'rx, 257 Ky.
808, 79 S.W.zd (1934). But see, Franklin Life Ins. Co. v. Strength, 58 So. 2d x26
(Ala. App. 195), cert. denied, 257 Ala. 167, 58 So. zd 129 (1951).
"Purcell v. Washington Fid. Nat'l Ins. Co., 146 Ore. 475, 30 P.zd 742 (1934).
In Wade v. Mutual Benefit Health & Ace. Ass'n, ix5 W. Va. 694, 698, 177 S.E. 61x,
614 (1934), the decision called for a "practical and intelligent 'staying in,' the nature
of the illness considered."
"3A judicial record of leniency toward nonconfinement in connection with common
sickness of indefinite seriousness might result in a great expansion of insurer liability
which could not be borne by the industry. Thus, a court must be more cautious in
dealing with, for example, mental disease or geriatric ailments than with Parkinson's
disease.
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More important, this approach establishes a line beyond which relief
is denied to genuinely disabled policyholders if they are not confined.
An increasing number of courts have attempted to resolve these
problems by abrogating the confinement clause. 4 Recognizing that the
purpose of disability insurance is income protection, these courts regard
the extent of confinement as merely evidence that the claimant's injury
or illness has rendered his economic position such that indemnification
by the insurer is warranted. In some jurisdictions this means that, to
become eligible for benefits, a claimant must prove "disability"j 25 in
others, he must show that the "character and extent" of his "sickness" are
sufficiently severe. 6 In reality, these requirements are the same.27 In
either case a high degree of confinement will improve the possibility of
recovery, but nonconfinement alone will not bar it.
The strongest countervailing consideration is that the injustices
wrought by the confinement requirement are infrequent and are ulti-
mately justified by the increased security provided the insurance com-
panies. It has been suggested that to deny this protection to insurers
would raise premiums beyond the reach of those people who most need
insurance.2 On the other hand, it can be safely asserted that injustices
are not occasional. While there is some correlation between actual
inability to earn and confinement, the connection is not always present.20
24 Not all of these courts are so bold in disregarding the clause as was the court in
American Cas. Co. v. Horton, 152 S.W.zd 395 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941). See, e.g.,
Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. Bocock, 77 Ariz. 51, 266 P.zd io8z (x954). See also, note
26 infra.
25 Federal Sur. Co. v. Waite, 297 S.W. 31z (Tex. Civ. App. 1927); American Cas.
Co. v. Horton, 152 S.W.zd 395 (Tex. Civ. App. x94i); Massachusetts Bonding &
Ins. Co. v. Springston, 283 P.2d 819 (Okla. 1955). Establishing legal disability
properly calls into account such basic issues as those enumerated previously in the text.
See note 23 supra and accompanying text.
" Many courts which follow this reasoning would not admit overthrowing the
clause. Indeed, some cases, e.g., Mutual Benefit Health & Acc. Ass'n v. McDonald, 73
Co1. 308, 215 Pac. 135 (1923), definitely demand a high degree of confinement. A
somewhat more liberal viewpoint is adopted in Wade v. Mutual Benefit Health & Acc.
Ass'n, 115 W. Va. 694, 177 S.E. 61i 0934). A study of the cases, however, indicates
that most courts following this view pay only lip service to the confinement requirement.
Where the claimant is thought worthy, his sickness will usually be adjudged severe
enough to excuse a great deal of nonconfinement. Thus, in Glenn v. Gate City Life
Ins. Co., z2o N.C. 672, 18 S.E.2d 113 (1942), recovery was allowed despite nearly
total lack of confinement.
" It has been recognized that the degree of sickness demanded by the latter school
seems to be that which is serious enough to be disabling. Adelman, supra note 5, at 161.2 8 Id. at 166.
" This is clearly borne out by cases such as the instant one, where disability was
never in issue. This case also aptly illustrates the impact of new devices and treatments
upon old notions about the correlation between disability and confinement.
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Further sympathy is evoked for the policyholder by the suspicion that
the policy is often sold, as protection "for when you can't work," by a
salesman who does not appreciate the legal implications of the confine-
ment provision.30
Moreover, insurers do not need the protection a literal interpretation
of the confinement clause provides. Courts can often detect malingerers
by utilizing modern procedural devices for discovering and presenting
medical evidence and by demanding a degree of proof in each case
commensurate with its susceptibility to fraud. As to those policies de-
manding confinement even for accident disability, it should be noted that
the accident itself is some evidence of the claim's authenticity. Finally,
in jurisdictions employing liberal construction, the clause has already
been drastically limited31 with no severe consequences. In these juris-
dictions complete abrogation of the confinement requirement would
create little additional opportunity for fraud and would foster the equi-
table adjustment of claims.
Prior to the Suits case North Carolina was firmly committed to the
rule in which confinement is merely evidence of the "character and
extent of sickness."132 The North Carolina Supreme Court has unwisely
repudiated that forward-looking, adaptable doctrine.
33
10Mackprang v. National Cas. Co., 127 Neb. 877, 257 N.W. 248 (1934); Federal
Sur. Co. v. Waite, 297 S.W. 312 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927).
81 See notes 17-21 supra and accompanying text.
"=Glenn v. Gate City Life Ins. Co., 220 N.C. 672, 18 S.E.2d 113 (1942) Thomp-
son v. Mutual Benefit Health & Acc. Ass'n, 209 N.C. 678, 184. S.E. 695 (1936).
" The opinion-writer disclaimed a repudiation of the rule previously adopted. Such
a position seems clearly untenable.
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